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Correlated TCP SYNFast ﬂux networks represent a special type of botnets that are used to provide highly available
web services to a backend server, which usually hosts malicious content. Detection of fast ﬂux
networks continues to be a challenging issue because of the similar behavior between these net-
works and other legitimate infrastructures, such as CDNs and server farms. This paper proposes
Fast Flux Watch (FF-Watch), a mechanism for online detection of fast ﬂux agents. FF-Watch is
envisioned to exist as a software agent at leaf routers that connect stub networks to the Internet.
The core mechanism of FF-Watch is based on the inherent feature of fast ﬂux networks: ﬂux
agents within stub networks take the role of relaying client requests to point-of-sale websites
of spam campaigns. The main idea of FF-Watch is to correlate incoming TCP connection
requests to ﬂux agents within a stub network with outgoing TCP connection requests from
the same agents to the point-of-sale website. Theoretical and trafﬁc trace driven analysis shows
that the proposed mechanism can be utilized to efﬁciently detect fast ﬂux agents within a stub
network.
ª 2014 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Cairo University.Introduction
Botnets, networks of compromised machines under an
attacker’s control, are the source of so many security threats
including distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, spam,
and identity theft [1–8]. Fast ﬂux networks (FFNs) represent a
special type of botnets that are being used by cybercriminals––
in a way similar to that used in Content Distribution Networks(CDNs) and Round Robin Domain Name System (RRDNS)––
to provide high availability and dynamicity for their malicious
websites (usually online scam websites). The main idea of fast
ﬂux networks is to use bot machines as proxies that relay user
requests to backend servers (i.e., the content servers). A frequent
and fast change of proxies (known as ﬂux agents) is required to
evade detection and blocking, and to ensure high availability at
the same time because these bots are often typical PCs that go
online and ofﬂine at different times.
Fast ﬂux networks represent a new trend in the operation
and management of online spam campaigns. In these cam-
paigns, spammers ﬂood email inboxes of thousands of email
users with advertisements about different products or services
(e.g., pharmaceutical, adult content, phishing, etc.). These
advertisements usually include hyperlinks to websites that rep-
resent the point-of-sale for the campaigns. Until recently, each
point-of-sale website is used to map to a single IP address that
Fig. 1 The basic idea of fast ﬂux networks. Fast ﬂux domain
resolves to multiple IP addresses that correspond to compromised
nodes serving as proxies for the content server. Domain-name-to-
IP-address mapping keeps changing over time.
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ing defenders the opportunity to block access to the corre-
sponding website, or even track it for the sake of legal
pursuits. With FFNs, the domain name of the point-of-sale
website maps to several IP addresses that keep changing at a
fast rate. Fast ﬂux domains are characterized by the very short
TTL values for their A records, and by the frequent change-of-
mapping to multiple IP addresses that usually belong to differ-
ent autonomous systems [9,10].
Previous work in the area of FFNs has mainly focused on
detecting and characterizing FFNs by analyzing Domain
Name System (DNS) records of suspicious domain names. In
this context, DNS records could be collected by actively query-
ing the DNS system for domain names found in spam email
messages (this approach was followed by Holz et al. [9]). Alter-
natively, the DNS records can be collected through passive
monitoring of DNS trafﬁc of an Internet Service Provider
(ISP) network (an approach that was followed by Perdisci
et al. [11]). Both approaches require collecting massive amount
of information for analysis, and they do not provide a real-
time detection of fast ﬂux agents.
In this paper, we propose a novel mechanism for real-time
detection of ﬂux agents within an organizational network with-
out requiring the collection of DNS trafﬁc information. The
proposed mechanism, called Fast Flux Watch (FF-Watch), is
envisioned to exist as a software agent at leaf routers that con-
nect stub networks to the Internet. The core mechanism of FF-
Watch is based on the inherent features of fast ﬂux networks
where ﬂux agents within stub networks take the role of relay-
ing/redirecting client requests to point-of-sale websites of spam
campaigns. Therefore, the basic idea is to correlate incoming
TCP connection requests to ﬂux agents within a stub network
with outgoing TCP connection requests from the same agents
to the point-of-sale website.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In ‘Fast ﬂux
networks’, we provide the relevant background about fast ﬂux
networks and their role in hosting online scam. ‘Methodology’
section describes the proposed FF-Watch mechanism. Then we
present the evaluation of the proposed FF-Watch mechanism
and discuss the results. Finally, conclusions and future re-
search directions are outlined.
Fast ﬂux networks
The issue of fast ﬂux networks was reported for the ﬁrst time
by the Honeynet project [12] in 2007. However, Holz et al. [9]
were the ﬁrst to study this phenomenon systematically in 2008.
Basically, FFNs can be considered as a special type of botnets
that are used by botmasters to provide high availability to their
malicious websites (known as mothership servers) while hiding
their location and identity (i.e., IP addresses) to avoid black-
listing. These networks consist of compromised nodes called
ﬂux agents that serve as proxies to the mothership servers. A
request to a fast ﬂux domain will go through one of the ﬂux
agents before being forwarded to the mothership server. The
ﬂux agent will relay the response back to the client as shown
in Fig. 1.
There have been considerable research efforts focusing
mainly on detecting and characterizing FFNs. Previous work
mainly relied on collecting domain names from e-mail’s spam
traps as the primary source of information, with the main goalis to classify domains into fast ﬂux domains and non-fast ﬂux
domains based on certain features and characteristics that dis-
tinguish fast ﬂux domains using different machine-learning
algorithms. Generally, the research done in this area can be
categorized, based on the approach followed in identifying ﬂux
agents, as follows.
 Active detection: In this approach, domain names of scam
websites are extracted from spam archives, which were
obtained from various spam traps. For each domain name,
several DNS queries are performed (e.g., using the dig tool)
to collect information about the set of resolved IP
addresses. DNS answers for these queries are then exam-
ined to determine whether the domain name is being either
legitimate or fast ﬂux. The decision is based on observing
certain features that characterize FFNs, and is usually done
using artiﬁcial intelligence algorithms. This approach was
adopted by most of the previous work in this ﬁeld [13].
 Passive detection: This approach was proposed Perdisci
et al. [11]. In this approach, live traces of DNS trafﬁc (que-
ries and answers) are collected by placing monitors at vari-
ous strategic locations in an ISP network. The trafﬁc is then
analyzed searching for FFNs’ footprints. The premise here
is that it is possible to capture DNS information of domain
names not only present in spam emails, but also in any
other online applications, such as chat rooms, and mali-
cious websites. The advantage of this approach is that it
does not pose additional load on network resources to
make active DNS lookups, as in the active approach. Addi-
tionally, it cannot be detected by botmasters who may sus-
pect high DNS lookup rates on their infrastructure.
 Real-time detection: Recently, Hsu et al. [14] presented a sys-
tem to detect FFNs in real-time with the goal to cut the
detection time to few seconds without affecting the detection
accuracy. The idea relies on the observation of the longer
delays for HTTP responses as a result of relaying the
requests via fast ﬂux agents. Relaying requests through fast
ﬂux nodes typically requires additional time because of the
FF-Watch 475relatively limited computation power and bandwidth associ-
ated with the agents. Another real-time fast ﬂux detection
approach was proposed by Martinez-Bea et al. [15].
The main problem with the passive approach is the need to
deal with huge amount of DNS trafﬁc traces that correspond
to legitimate and non-legitimate domain names. In contrast,
the active-detection-based approach deals with fewer amounts
of DNS trafﬁc traces that correspond to non-legitimate do-
main names in most cases. On the other hand, real-time detec-
tion approach may incur high false positive and false negative
rates due to the possibility of misclassifying legitimate Web
servers having both limited bandwidth and limited computing
power as fast ﬂux domains, while missing FFNs possessing
high bandwidth and computational capacity machines.
The empirical measurements of fast ﬂux networks per-
formed by Holz et al. [9] revealed very interesting facts about
the nature of these networks, such as geographical distribution
of ﬂux agents, sharing of ﬂux agents, and sharing of scam web
pages. Subsequent research studies have conﬁrmed these ﬁnd-
ings and added new knowledge to the ﬁeld. In particular, the
study performed by Konte et al. [10], focused on the dynamics
and roles of fast-ﬂux networks in mounting scam campaigns.
The study considered the rate of change in fast-ﬂux networks,
the change of locations in the DNS hierarchy, and the extent to
which the fast-ﬂux network infrastructure is shared across dif-
ferent campaigns. Other studies (e.g., [16,17]) focused on bot-
net detection through fast ﬂux identiﬁcation.
Our proposed mechanism, FF-Watch, differs completely
from the previous work in the sense that it does not require
collection and analyzing huge amounts of DNS trafﬁc actively
or passively. The key feature of FF-Watch is to utilize the
inherent feature of fast ﬂux networks that ﬂux agents within
stub networks take the role of relaying client requests to the
point-of-sale websites of spam campaigns. In this context,
FF-Watch can exist as a software agent at leaf routers that
connect end hosts to the Internet.
Methodology
In this section, we discuss the design and architecture of the
proposed FF-Watch mechanism. First, we explain the basic
idea of this mechanism, then we provide details about its dif-
ferent aspects.
The basic idea of FF-Watch
The basic idea of the proposed fast ﬂux detection mechanism is
to correlate incoming TCP connection requests (i.e., incoming
SYN packets) to machines within a stub network with outgo-
ing TCP connection (i.e., outgoing SYN packets) requests
from the same internal machines to an external server within
a certain time window. The intuition here is that such machines
are likely to act as ﬂux agents that are part of a fast ﬂux net-
work. Typically, ﬂux agents within a stub network act as prox-
ies that relay trafﬁc between web clients and a backend server
that hosts a malicious content. This means that monitoring
and correlating incoming and outgoing TCP connection estab-
lishment requests at the leaf router of a stub network would al-
low the identiﬁcation of ﬂux agents within that stub network.For illustration, we consider the scenario shown in Fig. 2a.
In this scenario, the-point of-sale website represents the con-
tent server of a spam campaign (e.g., www.anyproduct.com)
that employs fast ﬂux mechanisms. Machines A, B, and C
shown in the stub network are assumed to be ﬂux agents for
that domain. When a client visits www.anyproduct.com then
he/she will be directed via DNS to one of the agents in the stub
network (e.g., machine A). That agent then connects to the
point-of-sale server and relays content back to the client. After
the connection establishment with machine A, the client issues
HTTP speciﬁc commands (e.g., GET) and waits for the ser-
ver’s response. However, since machine A is acting as a ﬂux
agent that relays requests to a backend server, then the agent
itself establishes a TCP connection with that server and starts
relaying clients’ requests. A typical messages exchange between
the client, the ﬂux agent, and the mothership server (i.e., the
point-of-sale server) is shown in Fig. 2b.
Based on this example, it is clear that the leaf router of the
stub network is in the best position to monitor and detect ﬂux
agents within the associated network. As just mentioned, this
can be done by correlating incoming TCP connection requests
to machines inside the stub network with TCP connection re-
quests originating from the same machines to outside. To
achieve this, it is sufﬁcient to record the destination IP address
of an incoming SYN packet and the time the packet passes by
the router. An outgoing SYN packet with a source IP address
that matches one of the already recorded addresses (and within
a certain time window) is thus triggered as a strong indication
that such request is originating from a ﬂux agent within that
stub network. Fig. 3 shows the FF-Watch algorithm to be per-
formed at the leaf router of a stub network.
A Bloom ﬁlter-based implementation of FF-Watch (BFFF)
Bloom ﬁlters [18] represent a typical choice for efﬁcient imple-
mentation of the proposed FF-Watch algorithm because of its
ability to record SYN packets’ thumbprints with low storage
requirements and an adjustable false positive rate. In addition,
it offers fast way to check whether a packet is in the table or
not. Here, we provide a brief description of Bloom ﬁlters.
Next, we describe how to implement the proposed FF-Watch
mechanism using Bloom ﬁlters, and we provide theoretical
analysis of the efﬁciency of this implementation.
Bloom ﬁlters
A Bloom ﬁlter is a data structure for representing a set of ele-
ments (also called keys) to support membership queries [18].
The idea (illustrated in Fig. 4) is to allocate a vector R of m
bits, initially all set to 0, and then choose k independent hash
functions, each with range {1, . . .,m}. For each given key, A,
the bits at positions H1(A),H2(A), . . .,Hk(A) in R are set to 1.
(Note that, a particular bit position might be set to 1 multiple
times.) Given a query for a key B, we ﬁrst check the bits at
positions H1(B),H2(B), . . .,Hk(B). If any of them is 0, then cer-
tainly B was not previously inserted in the ﬁlter. Otherwise
(i.e., all Hi(B) are 1 s), we conjecture that B was inserted in
the ﬁlter although there is a given probability that this was
not the case, i.e., a false positive. The two parameters k and
m should be chosen such that the probability of a false positive
Fig. 2 (a) Typical scenario that shows the relative locations of a client, a ﬂux agent, and point of sale website. (b) Message exchange
between a client, a ﬂux agent and a mothership server. The ﬂux agent mainly serves as proxy that relays trafﬁc between the client and the
mothership server.
Fig. 3 FF-Watch algorithm to be performed at the leaf router of
a stub network for inbound and outbound SYN packets,
respectively. IST stands for the Incoming SYN Table. T represents
the time threshold.
Bit Vector
m bits
Source Address A
H  (A)
H  (A)
H  (A)
1
2
k
1
1
1
Fig. 4 A Bloom ﬁlter with k hash functions. For each SYN
packet received, BFFF computes k independent n-bit digests, and
sets the corresponding bits in the m= 2n-bit digest table.
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is given by [22]:
PFP ¼ 1 1 1
m
 kn !k
 ð1 ekn=mÞk: ð1ÞFig. 5 BFFF-Watch algorithm: A Bloom ﬁlter-based implemen-
tation of FF-Watch.Modiﬁed FF-Watch algorithm
The original FF-Watch algorithm (Fig. 3) represents a basic
and naı¨ve way to correlate incoming and outgoing SYN pack-
ets. The main challenge of using a Bloom ﬁlter to implement thebasic algorithm is the fact that we cannot keep track of SYN
packets’ arrival times. Therefore, it is not possible to map
incoming and outgoing SYN packets (to and from the same
source address) within a certain time window. To overcome this
problem, we propose to convert SYN packet’s arrival time to a
coarse time in a way similar to that used in SYN cookies [19]. As
such, the incoming SYN packets table (IST) can be imple-
mented as a Bloom ﬁlter with k hash functions. Inserting in-
bound SYN packets’ thumbprints in the IST can be achieved
by calculating the Bloom ﬁlter’s hash functions of the packet’s
destination IP address and its coarse time. On the other hand,
membership testing for outbound SYN packets can be achieved
by calculating the Bloom ﬁlter’s k hash functions of the packet’s
source IP address and its coarse time. In the latter, step, if any
one of the hashed IST bits is zero, the source address of the
packet was not previously stored in the table, and so the con-
nection is originating from a benign machine. If, however, all
the bits in the second step are one, it is highly likely the exact
source IP address of the packet was previously stored in IST.
However, it is also possible to have a false positive due to the
fact that some other insertions of different IP addresses resulted
in setting the same bits to one. Since a Bloom ﬁlter has limited
capacity, it is important to point out that once the full capacity
of the IST is reached, it becomes necessary to swap to another
empty one. Fig. 5 shows the Bloom-ﬁlter-based implementation
of the BFFF-Watch algorithm.
In SYN cookies, the coarse time, t, is a 32-bit time counter
that increases every 64 s [19]. It is possible to adapt the same
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 0  100  200  300  400  500  600
C
D
F
Interval Length (s)
Fig. 6 The cumulative distribution of time interval between an
incoming and outgoing SYN packets to and from the same
machine for the range [0,600] seconds.
 0
 0.01
 0.02
 0.03
 0.04
 0.05
 0.06
 0.07
 0.08
 0.09
 0  0.05  0.1  0.15  0.2
C
D
F
Interval Length (s)
Fig. 7 The cumulative distribution of time interval between an
incoming and outgoing SYN packets to and from a same machine
for the range [0,0.2] second.
FF-Watch 477approach for setting the coarse time in the BFFF-Watch algo-
rithm. However, 64 s is considered a large value for mapping
incoming and outgoing SYN packets from and to a ﬂux agent
within a stub network. In fact, the time counter increment rep-
resents an interesting parameter that affects the performance
of the algorithm. Selecting a large increment value would result
in high false positive rate because the algorithm would then
correlate SYN packets originating from sources inside the stub
network with those seen coming from outside which is not nec-
essarily true. On the other hand, selecting a small increment
value would result in high false negative rate because many
SYN packets originating from ﬂux agents within the stub net-
work might be missed.
Results and discussion
Ideally, evaluating the proposed FF-Watch mechanism re-
quires access to an enterprise trafﬁc traces (incoming and out-
going) that is conﬁrmed to contain fast ﬂux behavior. Because
such trafﬁc trace is difﬁcult to obtain, we used trafﬁc traces
that we believe do not contain fast ﬂux behavior since it dates
back to a time long enough before fast ﬂux had been employed
by botmasters. Analyzing such trafﬁc traces focusing on
incoming and outgoing SYN packets in a way similar to that
described in FF-Watch would provide guidance for selecting
the appropriate coarse time increments and the typical amount
of time for which packet digests need to be stored in the Bloom
ﬁlter. This time amount is necessary to estimate the memory
requirement of BFFF-Watch.
Trace-driven evaluation
In this subsection, we validate the proposed FF-Watch mech-
anism using Internet packet-level trafﬁc traces. The data con-
sist of 11 GB of anonymized packet header traces that were
originally collected at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
(LBNL); see [20]. The traces were gathered at two core routers
inside LBNL’s network during the following times
 10 min on October 4, 2004.
 One hour on December 15, 2004.
 Once hour on December 16, 2004.
 One hour on January 6, 2005.
 One hour on January 7, 2005.
We use these data for evaluation as follows. We ﬁrst pre-
process the trace ﬁles to extract only the SYN packets. Overall,
the trace ﬁles contained 550,226 SYN packets. For each resul-
tant record associated with a SYN packet, we take the destina-
tion IP address and search for matching source IP address
starting from the very next record in trace ﬁle. We report the
occurrences along with the time difference of the two SYN
packets (i.e., the ones having common IP addresses as a desti-
nation and as a source). We found that 97,713 such events that
enjoy the general behavior of FFNs. Fig. 6 shows the cumula-
tive distribution function (CDF) of the time interval length be-
tween an incoming and an outgoing SYN packet to and from a
same host observed at either router. Almost 90% of such
behavior (i.e., the suspected FFNs behavior) occurs in
10 min or less. (Note that in the ﬁgure, we have truncated
the results for interval lengths larger than 10 min.)Given that the whole idea of FFNs is to serve Web requests
via redirection, it is safe to assume that the time interval be-
tween an incoming and outgoing SYN needs to be minimal be-
cause of the interactivity characteristic of web requests and
responses. Hence, we then zoom into those intervals that are
shorter than 200 ms; the results are shown in Fig. 7. Approxi-
mately, 6% of the intervals are 100 ms or less. Therefore, a
question arises why such a behavior (i.e., the FFNs’ behavior)
exists in the trafﬁc.
First, it is due to the nature of the trafﬁc that contains both
intra-organizational trafﬁc and wide-area network trafﬁc. Due
to the anonymization process, we cannot separate these two
types of trafﬁc based on the IP addresses. However, closely
looking into the trafﬁc reveals that most of the suspected
behavior stems from e-mail, network management, host name
resolution, etc.; see [21] for a through categorization of the dif-
ferent trafﬁc types. Consequently, we then proceed to focus
only on the HTTP trafﬁc. The top part of Fig. 8 shows the
CDF of intervals for the HTTP trafﬁc only, that is, the trafﬁc
for which the incoming and outgoing requests are both HTTP.
Now, about 10% of the HTTP trafﬁc exhibits the FFNs
behavior with intervals of 100 ms or less; see the bottom part
of Fig. 8. However, 78% (434 out of 557) of all FFNs’ behav-
ior instances (with the HTTP) comes from only two machines
that we believe they work as HTTP proxies. After excluding
the trafﬁc associated with these two machines, we obtain the
results in Fig. 9. It is clear that all intervals are now higher than
1.4 s, a value that will never be appropriate for Web interactiv-
ity necessary for FFNs. As one conclusion, the results in Fig. 9
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Watch algorithm to be within this range, say, 1 s.
A concern might arise of how for a router to then differen-
tiate between legitimate web trafﬁc redirection (e.g., via open
proxies) and FFNs trafﬁc. The answer is to whitelist all such
legitimate services that are located inside an organization
perimeter, or within an ISP boundary.
Memory requirements of (BFFF-Watch)
The amount of memory required to store incoming SYN pack-
et thumbprints (digests) represents an important performance
metric that needs to be quantiﬁed. Keeping incoming SYNpacket digests for long time in the IST is not necessary in
BFFF-Watch because of the online nature of this algorithm.
In theory, it is obvious that packet digests need to be stored
in the IST for an amount of time that is slightly larger than
the time duration between incoming SYN packets destined
to certain nodes within the stub network and outgoing SYN
packets originating from the same nodes. Since this value var-
ies, we will assume that T seconds is an appropriate amount of
time that can be used after which IST can discard stored di-
gests to make room for new SYN packets.
Based on the results indicated in Fig. 9, we can say that dura-
tion of 1.4 s represents a suitable value ofT. However, this value
may be conservative and requires swapping the IST frequently,
so setting T to a larger value (e.g., 60 s) can be a better choice.
The amount of memory required by an IST depends on sev-
eral factors that include the number of incoming SYN packets
during the observation interval T, and the targeted false posi-
tive rate expressed in Eq. (1). For example, using a bloom ﬁlter
with three hash functions (k= 3), and a memory efﬁciency (n/
m) of 0.2, the effective false positive rate of 0.092 can be
achieved for full Bloom ﬁlter [22]. Based on these calculations,
a Bloom ﬁlter with size 1 M bits is sufﬁcient to store the digests
of 200,000 incoming SYN packets during an observation inter-
val of 60 s.
Conclusions
Fast ﬂux networks continue to be one of the major techniques
used by botnets to provide highly available malicious web ser-
vices without revealing the identity of a backend server. This
paper presented FF-Watch, a mechanism for online detection
of fast ﬂux agents. FF-Watch is proposed as a software agent
to exist at leaf routers that connect stub networks to the Inter-
net. The core mechanism of FF-Watch is based on the inherent
features of fast ﬂux networks where ﬂux agents within stub
networks take the role of relaying client requests to point-of-
sale websites of spam campaigns. The main idea of FF-Watch
is to correlate incoming TCP connection requests to ﬂux
agents within a stub network with outgoing TCP connection
requests from the same agents to the point-of-sale website.
An efﬁcient Bloom ﬁlter-based implementation of FF-Watch
was proposed. Theoretical and trafﬁc trace driven analyses
show that the proposed mechanism can be deployed to efﬁ-
ciently detect fast ﬂux agents within a stub network.
Future research directions include exploring collaborative
approach for fast ﬂux detection and identiﬁcation (localiza-
tion) of the mothership server(s), and evaluating the proposed
mechanism using recent trafﬁc traces that contain the fast ﬂux
behavior.
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